Bazar Valentines

A Baza Valentine’s Day

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In 2020, Proofpoint observed an increase in BazaLoader campaign volume peaking in October. During that time, we observed specific campaigns correlated to public reports of affiliate campaigns delivering BazaLoader and associated with Ryuk ransomware infections.i Notably, in January 2021, Proofpoint researchers observed a few of BazaLoader campaigns leveraging Valentine's Day themes such as flowers and lingerie. The attack chains required an unusual amount of human interaction before a payload was delivered. While we track a fair amount of BazaLoader delivered by TA800 and TA572, these campaigns are not associated with either TA800 or TA572 and are likely leveraged by other affiliates. 

BazaLoader Origin 

BazaLoader is a downloader written in C++ whose primary function is to download and execute additional modules. It was first observed in the wild in April 2020 and since has steadily been adopted by more actors. Proofpoint has observed at least six variants of Bazaloader signaling active and continued development.  One of the earliest BazaLoader variants Proofpoint researchers identified used ".bazar" top-level domains for command-and-control communication.  The ".bazar" TLDs are associated with cryptocurrency DNS named Emercoin using Blockchain services reported in early April 2020. Today, we do not see the same association to cryptocurrency infrastructure, but it is relevant to its provenance.  

Valentine’s Day  
Proofpoint researchers have spotted multiple BazaLoader campaigns in January and February 2021 involving the tactic of heavily relying on human interaction with different sites, PDF attachments, and email lures. There were a range of lure and subject topics, including compact storage devices, office supplies, pharmaceutical supplies, and sports nutrition, but what stuck out were campaigns that were timely and relevant to the upcoming Valentine’s Day holiday. The campaigns were spread across a diverse set of companies and sectors.   

Valentine’s Day, while not abused to the level of other holidays, presents an opportunity for a variety of actors. The FBI Boston field office has posted public warnings of romance scams. While this is not a romance scam, it is an example of social engineering well-timed with the Valentine’s Day holiday.ii  

Infection Chain 

 Figure 1: Infection Chain 

The infection chain is consistent in the latest campaigns. The websites the user would browse to are fake, but the actors took care to have the physical addresses in the below images match a near-legitimate location. For example, Ajour Lingerie is not located at 1133 50th St, Brooklyn, NY 11219, but this address is in physical proximity to a legitimate website and physical business called the Lingerie Shop. 

 

Figure 2: physical address to digital website 

Lingerie at Ajour 

This campaign delivered PDF attachments that references a specific customer order number and associated purchased items which entices the recipient to go to the Ajour Lingerie website. If the user visits the website and navigates to the "Contact Us" page, they are then given the option to enter the order number in the order ID. If entered, the contact page then redirects the user to the landing page that links to and explains how to open the Excel sheet. The Excel sheet contains macros that, if enabled by the user, will download BazaLoader.  

ShapeShape Figure 3: Email Lure 

 

Figure 4: Ajour Lingerie 

Figure 5: Landing Page 

Figure 6: Enable Content to deliver BazaLoader 

Flowers at Rose World  

This campaign is nearly identical—enticing users to check an order number. The campaign delivered PDF attachments with references to purchases at the Rose World website. If the user visits the website, navigates to "Contact Us", and enters the order number in the order ID, the site will redirect the user to a landing page. This landing page links to and explains how to open the Excel sheet. The Excel sheet contains macros that, if enabled, will download BazaLoader. 

 

Figure 7: Rose World Customer Order Email 

 

Figure 8: Invoice with website 

 

Figure 9: Rose World contact page and enter your order number 

Figure 10: Enable Macros to receive Bazaloader 

Conclusion:  

Proofpoint researchers have observed a steady growth in actors using BazaLoader as a 1st stage downloader. In addition to the uptick in BazaLoader distribution, there is active development of BazaLoader, particularly during the month of October 2020.  These recent BazaLoader campaigns exemplify affiliate actors leveraging a loader that is increasingly popular and more reliant on human interaction. Further, the social engineering features rely on the timeliness of the Valentine’s Day holiday and the intrinsic user curiosity to see what they may have ordered. From a technical point of view, we have provided a number of IOCs and ET signatures below as this malware family is used to execute on any number of actor or affiliate intentions, actions, and objectives.  

 

IOCs  

IOC 

IOC Type 

Description 

First Observed 

hxxps[://]cacla2006[.]org/achlom/hamin[.]php 

URL 

Excel Payload 

January 29, 2021 

447b4c867b7147afe178d73adf8113fc33f6399f03707e4308efa36e0859bf86 

SHA256 

BazaLoader Hash 

January 29, 2021 

hxxps://52[.]12[.]160[.]92/exceed/requested7/ppd15 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

January 29, 2021 

hxxps://34[.]220[.]204[.]73/exceed/requested7/ppd15 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

January 29, 2021 

hxxps[://]www[.]cutedigitalphotography[.]com/vitrum/caretas[.]php 

URL 

Excel Payload 

January 29, 2021 

b6e5f8a1d01bfa0524707ed914409ccb6d28137f05467b3fccb52af02e510f34 

SHA256 

BazaLoader Hash 

January 29, 2021 

hxxps[://]18[.]188[.]232[.]155/leading/crisis26/snow11 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

January 29, 2021 

hxxps[://]18[.]188[.]232[.]155/investigate/discharge/partially2 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

January 29, 2021 

hxxps[://]homeprojectplanning[.]com/germes/sanertl[.]php 

URL 

Excel Payload 

February 1, 2021 

fd142ad1919c5ca254b75745739a72aaec509afdd74715139ecc60266d7fdd3e 

SHA256 

BazaLoader Hash 

February 1, 2021 

hxxps[://]52[.]12[.]160[.]92/blog/entry/361446 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

February 1, 2021 

hxxps[://]52[.]12[.]160[.]92/goods/itemid/124324 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

February 1, 2021 

hxxps[://]54[.]190[.]50[.]234/organization/round_table 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

February 1, 2021 

hxxps[://]34[.]220[.]167[.]220/organization/round_table 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

February 1, 2021 

hxxps[://]18[.]236[.]86[.]87/organization/round_table 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

February 1, 2021 

hxxps[://]34[.]212[.]73[.]169/organization/round_table 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

February 1, 2021 

hxxps[://]morrislibraryconsulting[.]com/favicam/gertnm[.]php 

URL 

Excel Payload 

February 8, 2021 

b4acd05efadb07351ad853233220bf7f5dd13fbc26fd065d56925c05a42f1927 

SHA256 

BazaLoader Hash 

February 8, 2021 

hxxps[://]34[.]210[.]71[.]206/news/article/12422 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

February 8, 2021 

hxxps[://]34[.]210[.]71[.]206/artists/id/13131 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

February 8, 2021 

hxxps[://]acegikbcggin[.]bazar/news/article/12422 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

February 8, 2021 

hxxps[://]acegilbcggio[.]bazar/news/article/12422 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

February 8, 2021 

hxxps[://]horsehospital[.]com/assebles/hamnab[.]php 

URL 

Excel Payload 

February 8, 2021 

b5d7dc4e53f5242e6354c9e20bba1e49d2b34261f706a8c9c9e1b6b18bff348b 

SHA256 

BazaLoader Hash 

February 8, 2021 

hxxps[://]34[.]210[.]71[.]206/home/static 

C&C 

BazaLoader C&C 

February 8, 2021 

 

ET Signatures 

SID  

Name  

2844993  

ETPRO TROJAN bazaloader Variant CnC Activity  

2844992  

ETPRO TROJAN bazaloader Variant CnC Activity  

2844991  

ETPRO TROJAN bazaloader Variant CnC Activity  

2844795  

ETPRO TROJAN bazaBackdoor Variant CnC (Checkin)  

2844794  

ETPRO TROJAN Possible bazaloader CnC Activity M3  

2844766  

ETPRO TROJAN Possible bazaloader CnC Activity M2  

2844765  

ETPRO TROJAN Possible bazaloader CnC Activity M1  

2844764  

ETPRO TROJAN SSL/TLS Certificate Observed (bazaloader)  

2844763  

ETPRO TROJAN SSL/TLS Certificate Observed (bazaloader)  

2844355  

ETPRO TROJAN Observed bazaLoader User-Agent  

2844246  

ETPRO TROJAN bazar Backdoor CnC Activity  

2843035  

ETPRO TROJAN bazaBackdoor Variant CnC Activity M3  

2843034  

ETPRO TROJAN bazaBackdoor Variant CnC Activity M2  

2843033  

ETPRO TROJAN bazaLoader Variant CnC Activity M1  

2842090  

ETPRO TROJAN bazaLoader CnC (Download Request)  

2842073  

ETPRO TROJAN bazaBackdoor Variant CnC (Checkin)  

2031085  

ET TROJAN bazaloader Variant Activity  

2031084  

ET TROJAN bazaloader Variant Activity  

2030988  

ET TROJAN Observed Malicious SSL Cert (bazaLoader CnC)  

2030820  

ET TROJAN Observed Malicious SSL Cert (bazar Backdoor)  

2030270  

ET TROJAN Observed Malicious DNS Query (bazarLoader/Team9 Backdoor CnC Domain)  

2030269  

ET TROJAN Observed Malicious DNS Query (bazarLoader/Team9 Backdoor CnC Domain)  

2030268  

ET TROJAN Observed Malicious DNS Query (bazarLoader/Team9 Backdoor CnC Domain)  

2030267  

ET TROJAN Observed Malicious DNS Query (bazarLoader/Team9 Backdoor CnC Domain)  

2030045  

ET TROJAN bazaR CnC Domain in DNS Lookup  

2030044  

ET TROJAN bazaR CnC Domain in DNS Lookup  

2030043  

ET TROJAN bazaR CnC Domain in DNS Lookup  

2030042  

ET TROJAN bazaR CnC Domain in DNS Lookup  

2030041  

ET TROJAN bazaR CnC Domain in DNS Lookup  

2029973  

ET INFO Observed DNS Query for EmerDNS TLD (.bazar)